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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GODBOLD, Circuit Judge: 
 
Defendant William M. Dorsey pled guilty to three counts 
of bank robbery. On June 4, 1998, the district court 
sentenced him as a career offender under U.S.S.G. S 4B1.1 
because of his prior convictions of aggravated and simple 
assault. Defendant challenges the sentence on the ground 
that a Pennsylvania simple assault is not a "crime of 
violence" for purposes of the career offender guideline. 
 
Whether a particular crime constitutes a crime of 
violence is a question of law and the Court's review is 
plenary. U.S. v. McQuilkin, 97 F.3d 723, 727 (3d Cir. 1996), 
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2413 (1997). The burden is on the 
government to prove guideline enhancements by a 
preponderance of the evidence. U.S. v. Miele, 989 F.2d 659, 
663 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 
Whether simple assault qualifies as a predicate offense 
for purposes of the career offender guideline is an issue of 
first impression for the Third Circuit. The Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania has held that it does. U.S. v. Watson, No. 
CRIM. 92-672, 1993 WL 287621, at *4 (E.D. Pa. July 23, 
1993). See also U.S. v. Pratt, 913 F.2d 982, 993 (1st Cir. 
1990) (simple assault constituted career offender predicate). 
 
Under U.S.S.G. S 4B1.1, a defendant is a career offender 
if 1) the defendant was at least 18 years of age at the time 
he committed the instant offense of conviction; 2) the 
instant offense is a felony that is either a crime of violence 
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or a controlled substance offense; and 3) the defendant has 
at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of 
violence or a controlled substance offense. As to the first 
two elements, bank robbery is a crime of violence and the 
defendant was over 18 when he committed the instant 
offense. As to the third element, defendant's prior 
conviction for aggravated assault constitutes one of the 
predicate offenses. McQuilkin, 97 F.3d at 728. Therefore, 
the question is whether one of defendant's two convictions 
for simple assault constitutes the second predicate offense. 
 
Section 4B1.1 states that the predicate offense must be 
a "prior felony conviction." Application Note 3 to section 
4B1.2 states that, for purposes of determining career 
offender status under the guidelines, a "prior felony 
conviction" is one that is "a prior adult federal or state 
conviction for an offense punishable by death or 
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, regardless of 
whether such offense is specifically designated as a felony 
and regardless of the actual sentence imposed." As a 
second degree misdemeanor, the defendant's simple assault 
is punishable by a term of imprisonment for a term of more 
than one year. See 18 Pa. C.S.A. S 1104. Therefore, the 
defendant's conviction for simple assault is a felony for 
purposes of section 4B1.1. 
 
The sole remaining issue is whether simple assault is a 
"crime of violence." A "crime of violence" includes an offense 
that (1) "has as an element the use, attempted use, or 
threatened use of physical force against the person of 
another" or (2) ". . . involves conduct that presents a 
serious potential risk of physical injury to another." 
U.S.S.G. S 4B1.2(a). In Pennsylvania, a person is guilty of 
"simple assault" if he "1) attempts to cause or intentionally, 
knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another; 2) 
negligently causes bodily injury to another with a deadly 
weapon; or 3) attempts by physical menace to put another 
in fear of imminent serious bodily injury." 18 Pa. C.S.A. 
S 2701(a). Because all three parts of Pennsylvania's 
definition of simple assault necessarily involve"conduct 
that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury," a 
conviction under the statute is one for a "crime of violence." 
See Pratt, 913 F.2d at 993. 
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Defendant argues his conviction for simple assault 
cannot constitute a predicate offense because he could 
have been convicted if he recklessly caused bodily injury 
and a conviction for reckless injury does not fit within the 
definition of "crime of violence." That simple assault can be 
committed recklessly does not mean the conduct does not 
present a serious potential risk of physical injury. First, the 
Pennsylvania penal code states "a person acts recklessly 
with respect to a material element of an offense when he 
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk 
that the material element exists or will result from his 
conduct." 18 Pa. C.S.A. S 302 (1998). Second, purely 
reckless crimes may count as predicate offenses for 
purposes of career offender guideline. McQuilkin, 97 F.3d at 
729; U.S. v. Parson, 955 F.2d 858, 874 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 
Defendant also argues the sentence should be vacated 
because the court did not consider the facts contained in 
the charging documents. However, sentencing judges are 
not required to examine the actual underlying behavior 
when conducting career offender analysis. McQuilkin, 97 
F.3d at 727. See also Taylor v. U.S., 495 U.S. 575, 601 
(1990) ("the practical difficulties and potential unfairness of 
a factual approach are daunting"). 
 
The sentence entered June 4, 1998 will be affirmed. 
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